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Dans le cas de figure du  projet Apuiat, trois standards minima nous semblent 
devoir être mobilisés dans l’analyse qu’il convient de faire du respect de l’obligation 
de négocier de bonne foi : 1) l’obligation qu’a l’État de respecter les normes qu’il 
s’impose, 2) l’obligation de prendre des décisions sur la base de motifs respectueux 
du principe constitutionnel de l’honneur de la Couronne, et d’agir avec diligence, plus 
particulièrement lorsque des décisions peuvent léser la partie autochtone dans le cadre 
de négociations, et 3) l’obligation de veiller à maintenir le lien de confiance avec la 
nation concernée, en tenant compte des relations particulières passées et à venir. 
S’agissant des deux premiers éléments, les autorités gouvernementales et Hydro-
Québec ont tenté ou tenteront de les respecter en proposant certaines mesures 
réparatrices ou pourraient avoir à verser aux Innus des dommages-intérêts si un 
tribunal en venait à la conclusion qu’une promesse de contracter, au sens du droit civil, 
a bel et bien été faite et n’a pas été respectée. Mais encore, la société d’État et le 
gouvernement nous semblent avoir tous les deux négligés de tenir compte de leurs 
obligations constitutionnelles à l’égard de leur relation avec les Innus. En effet, le rejet 
du seul et premier projet unanimement accepté par l’ensemble des Premières Nations 
innues et des acteurs régionaux dans un contexte historique où les erreurs, les 
négligences, les stratégies de dépossession et les promesses rompues s’additionnent 
ne peuvent qu’alimenter la méfiance mutuelle. 
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In an interview in early-September 2018 shortly after the federal buy-out of the Trans 
Mountain Pipeline Expansion Project (TMEP), Prime Minister Justin Trudeau 
proclaimed that this project would be dead if it were not for the higher risk tolerance 
of the federal government compared to that of previous owner, Kinder Morgan, Inc. 
(KM).1 In other words, the federal government could guarantee completion where a 
private corporation had failed to make the project viable – perhaps even because the 
project no longer needed to be economically viable to succeed. This statement of the 
sitting Prime Minister is troubling for many reasons, central among which because he 
implies that governments have a higher risk tolerance vis-à-vis abrogating Aboriginal 
title and rights, when indeed they have a constitutional obligation to maintain them 
 
* Shiri Pasternak is an Assistant Professor in Criminology at Ryerson University in Toronto. Nicole Schabus 
is a lecturer at the Thompson Rivers University Faculty of Law.  
1 Zi-Anne Lum, “Trans Mountain Expansion Would Be ‘Dead’ if Feds Didn't Buy Pipeline: Trudeau. He 
Said the Government has ‘A Greater Tolerance for Risk’” Huffington Post (5 May 2018), online: 
<huffingtonpost.ca>. 
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and the honour of the Crown. Opposition to the pipeline, led by First Nations and 
environmental groups, was after all one of the reasons KM cited for selling off this 
asset.2 International environmental, Indigenous, and human rights obligations apply 
directly to governments, so if anything, the government of Canada should commit to 
implementing higher standards than industry.  
 
Given the widespread Indigenous opposition to the TMEP, the Prime 
Minister’s statement must be understood to suggest that the federal government is 
prepared to override inherent Indigenous rights. It also flies in the face of higher 
international standards to which states may be held as compared to private industry. 
The Prime Minister’s statement reflects the approach that the federal government has 
employed for decades in regard to Aboriginal title and rights. Rather than engaging 
with Indigenous peoples as nations with inherent responsibilities to govern their 
territories, a risk management strategy is deployed to manage the uncertainty of 
Indigenous land rights and broader territorial authority in Canada. 
 
This paper will examine the failure of governments to implement the broader 
territorial use-based concept of Aboriginal title and the resulting legal and economic 
risks posed in the context of the TMEP buy-out. This critical intervention considers 
Supreme Court of Canada decisions and Indigenous legal understandings of 
jurisdiction as territorially-based, revealing the precarious risk mitigation strategies of 
the federal government to gain social license for TMEP. The risk management 
approaches we will examine here include the British Columbia Treaty Commission 
(BCTC) process, which is a joint federal-provincial process under the federal 
Comprehensive Land Claims Policy (CLCP) that contradicts the Supreme Court on 
the territorial use-based concept  of Aboriginal title; the off-loading of fiduciary 
responsibilities and undermining of Indigenous territorial authority through private 
law instruments, such as Mutual Benefit Agreements (MBAs); and the socialization 
of risk through the buy-out itself.  
 
The economic uncertainty caused by Indigenous land interests in Canada is a 
perpetual risk for Crown corporations and industry undertaking major resource 
infrastructure projects.3 In this paper, we focus on Secwepemc (Shuswap) responses 
to the twinning of the Trans Mountain pipeline because the pipeline is proposed to run 
through more than 500 kilometers of their land and waters – the longest contiguous 
territory the pipeline would traverse if built – in the South-Central Interior of British 
Columbia (BC). Furthermore, the federal government has failed to engage with the 
Secwepemc people collectively, as the proper title and rights holder, to the proposed 
TMEP, let alone obtain their consent. In Secwepemc territory, some Indian band 
leadership have signed MBAs to allow for construction through their reserves in small 
spots along the pipeline route. Other bands, grassroots people, and alliances on the 
 
2 John Gibson, “With Project in Doubt, Kinder Morgan Shareholders Vote to Sell Trans Mountain Pipeline 
to Ottawa” CBC News (30 August 2018), online: <cbc.ca/news>. 
3 Martin Lukacs & Shiri Pasternak, “Aboriginal Rights A Threat to Canada’s Resource Agenda, Documents 
Reveal” The Guardian (2 March 2014), online: <theguardian.com>; Shiri Pasternak & Tia Dafnos, “How 
Does A Settler State Secure the Circuitry of Capitalism?” (2018) 36:4 Environment & Planning D: Society 
& Space 739. 
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territory have vigorously opposed the expansion of the pipeline, arguing that these 
reserves are a fractional representation of the broader Indigenous territory 
(Secwepemcúl’ecw) and cannot be used to pretend that Secwepemc consent regarding 
access to their territory has been obtained. Without weighing in on internal 
Secwepemc differences themselves, we seek to examine the federal government’s 
engagement process and risk management approach. Here, we find an ideal case study 
to study Canada’s cunning misinterpretation of “consent” and examine whether it is 
consistent with Indigenous, constitutional, and international law. 
 
We draw out this argument by first examining the broad territorial use-based 
concept of Aboriginal title articulated in the Tsilhqot’in v. British Columbia decision.4 
Then we trace this “Aboriginal title risk” back to the Delgamuukw v. British Columbia5  
decision and demonstrate through Freedom of Information requests on internal 
provincial government responses to Delgamuukw the internal policy responses and 
risk management approaches to constrain First Nations’ legal interest in land following 
this landmark legal decision on Aboriginal title.6 Internal documents obtained from 
the Ministry of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation and the Ministry of the 
Attorney General Office reveal a single-minded focus on mitigating the risk of 
Aboriginal title and securing “economic certainty” by accelerating the British 
Columbia Treaty Process. We argue that these records, along with contingent liability 
accounting procedures that emerge post-Delgamuukw, provide critical context for the 
Trans Mountain pipeline expansion because they reveal the wheels in motion to 
foreclose the jurisdiction of Indigenous nations asserting and exercising their inherent 
rights and Aboriginal title. 
 
From here, we show how this risk is not only managed through public policy 
development, but also through the privatization of uncertainty and the socialization of 
risk. This risk management approach involves contractual agreements signed by the 
proponent with Indian Bands. Kinder Morgan reported signing 33 MBAs with 
Indigenous people in BC that would redistribute $400 million to First Nations 
communities. Often these agreements are made with Indian Bands, who legally only 
have delegated authority from the federal governments on Indian reserves. They do 
not address the issue of access to the larger territory. Therefore, we ask, regarding 
these private agreements: where does the territorial aspect of Aboriginal title come 
into play? How do private mutual benefit agreements line up with the legal obligations 
to the land under Indigenous law, or under the settler law of Aboriginal title? 
 
On the one hand, governments and proponents obscure the risk of Aboriginal 
title through fragmented agreements that would not meet constitutional standards of 
consent. On the other hand, through Canada’s pipeline purchase, the federal 
 
4 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in]. 
5 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 220 NR 161 [Delgamuukw cited to SCR). 
6 British Columbia, Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation IRR-2018-80628 (17 July 2018), online: (pdf) 
< docs.openinfo.gov.bc.ca/Response_Letter_IRR-2018-80628.pdf>; British Columbia, Minister of the 
Attorney General Office MAG-2018-80625 (23 April 2018), online: (pdf) 
<docs.openinfo.gov.bc.ca/Response_Letter_MAG-2018-80625_.pdf>. 
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government is attempting to “socialize” this risk by passing it on to all Canadians. 
Canada has taken on Kinder Morgan’s obligations under the MBAs and other private 
instruments, when they should maintain a higher standard and implement the human 
and Indigenous rights obligations that apply directly to the state. We argue that with 
regards to the TMEP the federal government has cunningly misinterpreted consent to 
undermine Indigenous decision-making regarding access to their larger territories. 
  
Secwepemc Territorial Authority 
 
Secwepemcul’ecw, the territory of the Secwepemc, covers 180,000 square kilometres 
and spans the interior plateau of south-central BC. It extends from the Western shore 
of the Fraser River, covering much of this larger watershed, including the South and 
North Thompson Rivers, and reaches all the way to the Rocky Mountains in the East. 
The proposed TMEP route follows much of the North Thompson River; and therefore, 
any spill stands to impact the larger Fraser River watershed – home to some of the 
largest remaining salmon runs in the world. 
 
This territory not only belongs to the Secwepemc, it has been governed by 
the Secwepemc nation for thousands of years. As noted by Teit in 1909, the 
Secwepemc shared a concept of land tenure with other interior nations that was 
collectively-minded: “All the land and hunting grounds were looked upon as tribal 
property all parts of which were open to every member of the (Secwepemc) tribe. Of 
course, every band had its common recognized hunting, trapping, and fishing places, 
but members of other bands were allowed to use them whenever they desired.”7 This 
territorial concept was also elaborated in the Memorial to Sir Wilfred Laurier (1910), 
when the Interior chiefs articulated their grievances to Canada in the form of a letter 
to the then Prime Minister. 
 
In the letter, the Interior chiefs explained that “the principle of collective land 
tenure [is] at the level of the ‘tribe,’ or nation, as opposed to land ownership resting 
with the village group or with families, let alone with individuals.”8 Knowing and 
having delineated the defined boundaries of Secwepemcúl’ecw (Shuswap territory) 
with neighboring nations, they maintained an internal coherence of Indigenous 
nationhood within their territory. As Ron Ignace and Marianne Ignace describe: 
“[t]heir words conveyed the concept of the Secwépemc, Nlaka’pamux, St’at’imc, 
Syilx (Okanagan), and others as distinct nations, thus refusing to surrender to the 
nucleation of these nations into ‘bands’ imposed by the Canadian government in the 
1876 Indian Act.”9 Though, of course, the Secwepemc nation changed with 
colonization and the imposition of colonial governance structures onto Indigenous 
 
7 James Teit, The Jesup North Pacific Expedition: Memoir of the American Museum of Natural History 
(New York: Leiden EJ Brill Ltd Printers and Publishers, 1909) at 572. 
8 “Memorial to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Premier of the Dominion of Canada From the Chiefs of the Shuswap, 
Okanagan and Couteau Tribes of British Columbia presented at Kamloops, BC” (25 August 1910), online 
(pdf): <skeetchestn.ca/files/documents/Governance/memorialtosirwilfredlaurier1910.pdf>. 
9 Ron Ignace & Marianne Ignace, Secwépemc People, Land, and Laws: Yerí7 Re Stsqʼeyʼs-Kucw (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017) at 281–82. 
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nations. The Laurier Memorial demonstrates how the colonial government arbitrarily 
resorted to limiting not only the land base of bands to reserves, but also their ability to 
practice their laws and governance within Secwepemcúl’ecw at large. 
 
Secwepemc leader Arthur Manuel presented us with a powerful analysis of 
some of the indicators of colonialism starting with dispossession, pointing out that 
“Indian Reserves just account for 0.2 of our territory. Canada claims 99.8 per cent of 
our land”10 He continued to explain that the resulting dependency is not an accident of 
history, but [it is] at the heart of the colonial system, resulting in Indian Bands whose 
delegated authority is limited to Indian Reserves, administering this poverty.11 It is 
also in this context that MBAs with Indian Bands have to be viewed. They cannot 
grant access to the larger territory and the funds provided are not in the least 
commensurate to the profits gained by the corporation. If anything, Manuel would 
maintain that they are benefitting yet again off the deliberately created dispossession 
and dependency of Indigenous peoples. 
 
In 1951, four decades after the powerful Laurier Memorial was presented, the 
federal government unilaterally approved the original Trans Mountain pipeline 
through Secwepemc territory without engaging with the Secwepemc people. This was 
still the time Indigenous peoples were prohibited under the Indian Act from organizing 
around land issues, and lawyers who worked for them on such issues could be 
disbarred.12 The original Trans Mountain pipeline, whose capacity the federal 
government is now trying to triple, went into operation in 1953 without the 
Secwepemc people’s consent and effectively without their input. This time, in regard 
to the TMEP, the Secwepemc people were clear that they not only had to be heard, but 
that they should be decision-makers regarding access to their territory, especially in 
light of the risk the proposed project poses to their Indigenous economies and ongoing 
uses of their lands and waters. It was Secwepemc land and water defenders who 
stepped up first raising concerns about the proposed TMEP and started to monitor its 
impacts, including the illegal installation of mats that block salmon spawning in waters 
proposed to be crossed by the pipeline.13 
 
In June 2017, Secwepemc grassroots activists hosted an assembly on 
development impacting Secwepemcúl’ecw, from which they issued the “Secwepemc 
Peoples Declaration on Protecting Our Land and Water against the Kinder Morgan 
Trans Mountain Pipeline.” The statement reads in part: 
 
Secwepemcúl’ecw is the largest indigenous territory that the Kinder Morgan 
pipeline expansion project is proposed to pass through, covering up to 518 
 
10 Arthur Manuel, Reconciliation Manifesto: Recovering the Land, Rebuilding the Economy (Toronto: James 
Lorimer and Company, 2017) at 69. 
11 Ibid at 70–71. 
12 John Leslie, “The Indian Act: An Historical Perspective” (2002) 25:02 Can Parliamentary Rev, online 
(pdf): <revparl.ca/25/2/25n2_02e_Leslie.pdf>. 
13 Canadian Press and National Observer, “NEB Cracks Down on Kinder Morgan for Disrupting Streams 
on Pipeline Route” (26 September 2017), online: <nationalobserver.com>. 
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km of the pipeline route. The federal and provincial governments and 
Kinder Morgan have failed to engage with the Secwepemc collectively, as 
the proper title and rights holders. Their infringement of our laws, our 
spirituality, and our relationship to the land can never be accepted or 
justified […] We the Secwepemc have never provided and will never 
provide our collective consent to the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain 
Pipeline Project. In fact, we hereby explicitly and irrevocably refuse its 
passage through our territory.14 
 
This is not just idle talk. Many of the grassroots land defenders, joined together as the 
Tiny House Warriors, have put 5 tiny houses in the pathway of the proposed pipeline 
route (with one more currently on the way at the time of this writing) and the proposed 
site for a “man camp” where labourers are to be housed during the construction 
phase.15 The Tiny House Warriors are currently raising money to build 4 more houses 
and have set up a base blockading the construction of the Blue River “man camp” 
settlement. 
 
Complex relations of consent are represented in the Secwepemc Peoples 
Declaration: they invoke the need for collective consent among the Secwepemc nation 
as well as the legal obligations of the Secwepemc people to protect the land as a matter 
of consensual relations with all the living beings on their territory. Indigenous legal 
orders are not a positive law tradition amongst human beings; non-human beings have 
agency within Secwepemc law.16 Therefore, consensus building is an ongoing 
relational process, where Indigenous peoples must ensure they have all the necessary 
information to take into account potential impacts of environmental change on their 
kin. Connected to the first principle of consent – its collective, national form – the 
Indigenous legal authority of the Secwepemc is the nation, which embodies for them 
jurisdiction and responsibility over their lands and water. For example, in their stories 
that carry law (stsptekwll) these relationships are described, as set out in this 
commentary on the story of Coyote (Skelep) and salmon:  
 
 
14 Secwepemcul’ecw Assembly, “Secwepemc Peoples Declaration on Protecting Our Land and Water 
against the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain Pipeline” (4 June 2017), online: <secwepemculecw.org>. 
15 Justin Brake, “Tiny House Warriors Establish New Village to Resist Pipeline, Assert Secwepemc 
Sovereignty” APTN National News (19 July 2018), online: <aptnnews.ca>; see also Tiny House Warriors, 
online: <secwepemculecw.org/tiny-house-warriors>. 
16 This commonality in Indigenous national legal systems is evident throughout these lands. See, for 
example, Wapshkaa Ma’iingan, “Aki, Anishinaabek, kaye tahsh Crown” (2010) 9:1 Indigenous LJ 107; 
John Borrows, Canada’s Living Constitution (Toronto: U of T Press, 2010); Val Napoleon, “Thinking 
About Indigenous Legal Orders,” Research Paper for the National Centre for First Nations Governance (18 
June 2007), online (pdf): <fngovernance.org/ncfng_research/val_napoleon.pdf>; Sarah Morales, “a 
‘lha’tham:* The Re-Transformation of s. 35 through a Coast Salish Legal Methodology” (2017) 37:2 NJCL 
145; Fred Metallic, “Treaty and Mi’gmewe,” in Marie Battiste, ed, Living Treaties: Narrating Mi’Kmaw 
Treaty Relations (Sydney, NS: Cape Breton University Press, 2016), at 42–51; Sylvia McAdam, Nationhood 
Interrupted: Revitalizing Nêhiyaw Legal Systems (Vancouver: Purich Press, 2015); Sue Hill, The Clay We 
Are Made Of (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2017); Lucien Ukaliannuk, “Inuit Traditional Law: 
Perspectives from an Elder,” in Building Capacity in Arctic Societies: Dynamics and Shifting Perspectives 
(Proceedings of the Second IPSSAS Seminar) (Iqaluit, NU, 2003) 171, online (pdf): 
<alaskacollection.library.uaf.edu/monos/Building_capacity_in_Arctic_Societies_Dynamics_Shifting.pdf. 
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[…] the stsptekwll, beyond explaining natural events and geographic 
features, cast events in the framework of social relationships, thus providing 
us with lessons about the historical and continuing interconnection of the 
Secwepemc and the Nlaka’pamux as connected through kinship and 
intermarriage. It also gives us lessons about the relationship between 
humans and salmon, mediated by Skelep’s actions.17 
 
While the Declaration asserts Secwepemc opposition to the pipeline expansion, 
embodied in Secwepemc law, activism against it started much earlier through formal 
challenges within and to the consultation process. Secwepemc leader and former 
Neskonlith chief Arthur Manuel testified to the National Energy Board in 2014, stating 
that the expansion of Trans Mountain reflects “unfinished business” between Canada 
and the nation.18 Below, we detail the encounters between Indigenous and settler law 
as the approval process for the TMEP unfolded, and the ways in which the terms of 
Indigenous consent – based on territorial authority – were sidelined through the state’s 
manipulation of its meaning to Secwepemc communities who refused the project. 
Settler Recognition of Indigenous Territorial Authority 
 
As set out above under Secwepemc law, the Secwepemc people collectively are “the 
proper title and rights holder,” which is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decisions in Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in Nation. But here it is important to 
foreground that this settler legal holding confirms inherent Indigenous law, rather than 
creates this governance process. Aboriginal Title is a sui generis right, and the proper 
title and rights holder has to be defined by Indigenous law, with the respective 
Secwepemc law set out above. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada long recognized that Aboriginal title has an 
“inescapable economic aspect,”19 which, along with a jurisdictional dimension, are 
integral parts of the right to self-determination, which serves as a remedy for 
colonialism under international law. When rendering its decision in Tsilhqot’in, the 
Supreme Court of Canada was well aware of its implications for other Indigenous 
peoples, especially in BC, noting from the outset that, “there are hundreds of 
Indigenous groups in British Columbia with unresolved land claims.”20 The Supreme 
Court of Canada, explicitly rejected a site-specific approach to Aboriginal title that 
provincial and federal governments continued to bring forward. It stated:  
 
There is no suggestion in the jurisprudence or scholarship that Aboriginal 
title is confined to specific village sites or farms, as the Court of Appeal 
held.  Rather, a culturally sensitive approach suggests that regular use of 
territories for hunting, fishing, trapping and foraging is “sufficient” use to 
ground Aboriginal title, provided that such use, on the facts of a particular 
case, evinces an intention on the part of the Aboriginal group to hold or 
 
17 Ignace & Ignace, supra note 9. 
18 Arthur Manuel, “Neskonlith Indian Band” (Oral presentation delivered at the National Energy Board 
Hearing in Kamloops, BC, 18 November 2014).  
19 Delgamuukw, supra note 5 at para 166. 
20 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 4. 
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possess the land in a manner comparable to what would be required to 
establish title at common law.21  
 
It went even further in pointing to one of the main sources of uncertainty and the 
fundamental flaw of the province’s argument before it. The court stated, that “[m]ost 
of the Province’s criticisms of the trial judge’s findings on the facts are rooted in its 
erroneous thesis that only specific, intensively occupied areas can support Aboriginal 
title.” 22 The failure to implement the territorial-use based concept of Aboriginal title, 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in and previously set out in 
Delgamuukw, causes significant economic uncertainty.23 
The loss of investment due to the failure to address Indigenous land rights, 
especially in the vast Indigenous territories in the Interior of British Columbia where 
historically no treaties were signed, has been well documented.24 Only the 
implementation of a territorial concept of Aboriginal Title, which the Supreme Court 
of Canada maintained in Tsilhqot’in, can help overcome this uncertainty and 
implement Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination to freely pursue their 
economic, social, and cultural development. 
 
The right to self-determination is the international remedy for colonization. 
Canada is a party to and bound to implement the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)25 and the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).26 These treaties, also known as the decolonization 
covenants, share the same first overarching provision on self-determination. Article 1, 
para 1, of both covenants states that: “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. 
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.” The same wording is replicated in 
Article 3 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
21 Ibid at para 42. 
22 Ibid at para 60. 
23 As the Court stated: “Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to those associated with fee simple, 
including: the right to decide how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; 
the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use 
and manage the land” (Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 73). Further, “[t]he right to control the land conferred 
by Aboriginal title means that governments and others seeking to use the land must obtain the consent of 
the Aboriginal title holders. If the Aboriginal group does not consent to the use, the government’s only 
recourse is to establish that the proposed incursion on the land is justified under s. 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982” (Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 76). 
24 Price Waterhouse, “Economic Value of Uncertainty Associated with Native Claims in British 
Columbia” (30 March 1990), online: (pdf) <publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/aanc-inac/R32-
362-1990-eng.pdf >; BC Treaty Commission, Press Release, “Treaties Will Boost BC Economy by Vver 
$10 billion” (18 November 2009), online: <newswire.ca/news-releases/treaties-will-boost-bc-economy-by-
over-10-billion-538987511.html>. 
25 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR]. 
26 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR]. 
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(UNDRIP),27 confirming that the right applies to Indigenous peoples. This further 
verifies a clear consensus of the community of nations that has emerged in endorsing 
UNDRIP, with no nation state remaining opposed. 
 
Furthermore, multi-lateral environmental agreements (MEAs) recognize the 
key role Indigenous Peoples play in ensuring economically, culturally, and 
environmentally sustainable development in their traditional territories, and prior 
informed consent is required prior to accessing traditional knowledge or genetic 
resources of Indigenous peoples. MEAs and UNDRIP28 stipulate Indigenous prior, 
informed consent to developments that could impact their traditional territories. 
Hence, the implementation of the principle of prior informed consent requires a 
territorial approach, and anything short of it will exacerbate economic uncertainty. 
The legal and economic uncertainty has been further leveraged by Indigenous 
peoples from Canada, including the Secwepemc, who have long taken violations of 
their Indigenous rights to international bodies, including before United Nations (UN) 
human rights bodies and international trade tribunals. Tribunals of both the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
accepted amicus curiae submissions of the Secwepemc and Okanagan logging case 
litigants, providing further recognition of the economic dimension of Aboriginal 
title.29 Canada’s failure to provide effective domestic remedies for Indigenous peoples 
to exercise their inherent rights and self-determination opens the way for direct 
complaints to international tribunals and human rights bodies. For example, the 
Hul'qumi'num Treaty Group were successful in proving the lack of effective national 
remedies in dealing with Aboriginal Title in their complaint to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) outlining the failure of the courts to address 
issues related to Aboriginal Title in a timely and effective manner, as well as the failure 
of the BCTC to provide an effective remedy.30 
 
Still, following the Tsilhqot’in decision, the provincial and federal 
governments did not take the necessary steps to implement the broader territorial-use 
based concept of Aboriginal Title. In regard to the TMEP, they continued to maintain 
a site-specific approach, focusing on dealing with Indian Bands along the pipeline 
route, who only have delegated authority on Indian Reserves. Instead, the governments 
continue to maintain their impoverished and rejected “postage-stamp” concept of 
Aboriginal title, which had already been rejected by the trial judge in Tsilhqot’in by 
 
27 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st SESS, 
A/RES/61/295, (2007) [UNDRIP]. 
28 Ibid; see also Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 art 3 (entered into force 
29 December 1993); Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, 2 February 11 (entered into force 12 October 2014); and, 
Akwe:Kon Guidelines (Montreal, QC: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2004).  
29 Arthur Manuel & Nicole Schabus, “Indigenous Peoples at the Margin of the Global Economy: A Violation 
of International Human Rights and International Trade Law” (2005) 8 Chap L Rev 229.  
30 IAHRC, “Report No. 105/09, Petition 592-07, Admissibility Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group Canada” (30 
October 2009), online: <cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Canada592.07eng.htm>. 
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Justice Vickers,31 whose findings on Aboriginal title and a broader territorial concept 
of Aboriginal Title were made legally binding by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Despite all these decisions, the governments still fail to engage with Indigenous 
peoples as decision-makers regarding access to their lands and resources beyond 
narrow reserve boundaries. Through their processes, they violate not only Canadian 
Constitutional law, but also international human and Indigenous rights obligations, 
including Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and to economically, 
socially, and culturally sustainable development in their territories. 
 
From Aboriginal Title to Risk Mitigation 
 
Nowhere is the government’s strategy of mitigating the risk of Indigenous territorial 
authority more evident than in its approach to land claims policy. The Comprehensive 
Land Claims Policy (CLCP) was introduced by the federal government in response to 
the Calder decision in 1973.32 In the first decision since the prohibition on organizing 
around land rights had been lifted, the court split on the continued existence of 
Aboriginal title, and the case was dismissed on a technicality. The government set out 
to address the resulting uncertainty regarding Indigenous land rights through a blanket 
extinguishment policy, and only a small number of nations across Canada entered into 
the negotiation process. 
 
In British Columbia, the British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) 
process was only established in 1992 to implement negotiations based on the federal 
Comprehensive Claims Policy. Then, when the Delgamuukw decision came down on 
December 11th, 1997, it offered a much different conception of the extent of 
Aboriginal land interests than those recognised in the negotiating parameters of the 
BCTC. The appellants in Delgamuukw were Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en hereditary 
chiefs who brought the case to court on behalf of 71 governing Houses, claiming 
ownership and jurisdiction over 58,000 kilometers of their territory in Northern BC. 
Although remitting the substantive decision back to trial, Delgamuukw affirmed the 
concept of Aboriginal title as an Indigenous interest in the land that is sui generis, 
distinct from other forms of land title, proprietary, and held communally by the 
nation.33 Though the burden of proof for Aboriginal title and the cost of bringing a 
case to court remain substantial barriers, the Delgamuukw case made it clear that 
Indigenous peoples can no longer be ignored by the resource industry; their land rights 
have to be taken into account.34 As such, the decision sent shockwaves through the 
country, coalescing around fears of “economic uncertainty.” 
 
31 Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at para 610. 
32 Calder v British Columbia (AG), [1973] SCR 313, 34 DLR (3d) 145 [Calder]. 
33 Respectively, Delgamuukw, supra note 5 at para 190, 115, 140. While in the latter case, the Court 
distinguishes Aboriginal title from fee simple property, Lamer CJ states that it is “a right to the land itself,” 
and clearly a proprietary interest. 
34 Nonetheless, there are still substantial issues with the decision. See e.g. John Borrows, “Sovereignty's 
Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537; Gordon 
Christie, “A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw And Haida Nation” (2005) 
23 Windsor YB Access Just 17. 
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It is helpful then to understand how governments sought to manage this legal 
and economic uncertainty at this historical moment. To ascertain this internal response 
to the decision, Freedom of Information (FOI) requests were submitted to BC for “[a]ll 
records, including internal reports, memos, briefing notes and emails, that offer 
response / analysis/ assessment/ commentary to the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 – in particular, any policy 
changes, policy assessments and evaluations, and any other mechanisms designed or 
adapted to respond to implications of the legal decision to the Ministry. (Date Range 
for Record Search: From 12/01/1997 to 12/01/2000).” This request was sent to the 
Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG), the Ministry of Indigenous Relations and 
Reconciliation (MIRR), the Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources, and 
the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy. Of these, we will focus on 
responses returned from MAG and MIRR. 
 
Among the immediate post-Delgamuukw reactions was a course of action that 
involved convening a “Certainty Working Group” by the Treaty Negotiations 
Advisory Committee (TNAC), which is a province-wide consultation process that 
allows third-parties to advise the government on negotiations with First Nations. At 
the December meeting, participants strongly recommended risk mitigation strategies 
to reign in the powers of First Nations to assert jurisdiction over their territories.35 For 
example, Marlie Beets, representing the Council of Forest Industries, captures the 
anxiety of the group when she states: 
 
I am late this afternoon because I have spent the last hour talking to our 
CEOs and trying to calm them down. This decision concerns the forest 
industry greatly. It remains to be seen what effect it will have on our licenses 
and tenures, and for the investment our members have made in BC. This has 
only created more uncertainty and we are very concerned by how 
governments will react to the Court’s findings. The decision makes the need 
for certainty through surrender all the more clear. We see no other 
alternative.36 
 
The solution of Indigenous land “surrender” emerges as the consensus within the 
group to secure certainty and mitigate the risk of Aboriginal title. A representative of 
the BC Cattlemen’s Association, Mary McGregor, calls the Delgamuukw decision 
“totally detached from the economic realities that exist in British Columbia” – 
simultaneously erasing the economic hardship of those dispossessed from their lands 
due to these provincial “realities,” while implying the question of Indigenous rights 
should “attach” subordinately to the property rights of settler populations. McGregor 
then insists that the treaty process be used to “clearly surrender all claims of 
Aboriginal rights and title throughout a First Nations claimed traditional territory.”37 
Like that proposed by Beets, the only solution is to eliminate immediately and 
 
35 Treaty Negotiations Advisory Committee, “Meeting Notes from Certainty Working Group” (12 and 13 
December 1997), obtained through FOI request to MAG-2018-80625. 
36 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
37 Ibid. 
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expediently the newly acknowledged rights in Delgamuukw through pre-existing 
policy. Chris Harvey, legal counsel at Russell and Dumoulin, concurs at the meeting 
that, “[w]hat is needed is a clear exchange and an end of Aboriginal rights and title 
for a defined set of treaty rights.”38 The only path to economic certainty for the 
province, as far as the working group representatives seem to be concerned, is the 
elimination of Aboriginal title.39 
 
The “surrender” these committee members refer to is a specific kind of 
“exchange” of rights within the BCTC. Since its establishment, the BCTC has been 
promoted as the key to economic certainty in BC. Its terms of settlement require groups 
to “exchange” section 35 rights for an exhaustive, circumscribed set of rights that 
extinguish or modify Aboriginal title out of existence.40 Though many First Nations 
support the process, from the province’s perspective, it is far preferable to litigation 
on Aboriginal title. When the Delgamuukw decision came down, Geoff Plant, BC 
Liberal MLA and former counsel to the Crown on the case at the BC Supreme Court, 
stated to local media: “[i]n terms of British Columbia, [Delgamuukw] is breathtaking. 
This judgement has undermined certainty of title for virtually all lands in British 
Columbia.”41 He too argued for, and later as Attorney General implemented, a 
referendum to reconsider BC’s treaty negotiation mandates that included a principle 
that self-government “should have the characteristics of local government, with 
powers delegated from Canada and British Columbia” – a move away from a territorial 
authority approach.42 
 
To compare the terms of negotiation under the BCTC to the legal protection 
of Aboriginal title, we can look to the Tsilhqot’in decision of 2014, which resulted in 
the first declaration of Aboriginal title in Canadian history to have met the evidentiary 
thresholds affirmed in Delgamuukw. The Tsilhqot’in nation brought forward the case 
to prove their land rights in a core traditional and current use area where the province 
was issuing commercial logging licences over the objections of community members. 
When the decision came down, Hupacasath member Judith Sayers analyzed how 
Tsilhqot’in (and Aboriginal title declarations more generally) could more effectively 
protect Indigenous jurisdiction than the BCTC. She compared the massive loss of 
 
38 Ibid [emphasis added]. 
39 These fears went beyond BC, as well, as reported in the North Shore News: “[I]t is clear that our unelected 
judicial legislators, in approving the notion of ‘aboriginal rights to the occupation and use of the land’ have, 
to put it mildly, thrown into question not only the ownership of the lands comprising 110% of the province 
of BC, but also that of other western provinces too” (Charles MacLean, columnist, North Shore News, 17 
December 1997). 
40 Arthur Manuel & Ronald M Derrickson, Unsettling Canada: A National Wake-Up Call (Toronto: 
Between the Lines, 2014); see also Carole Blackburn, “Searching for Guarantees in the Midst of 
Uncertainty: Negotiating Aboriginal Rights and Title in British Columbia.” (2005) 104:7 American 
Anthropologist 586. 
41 Geoff Plant (BC Liberal MLA), Richmond News (17 December 1997). 
42 British Columbia, Auditor General, 2006/2007 Report 3 Treaty Negotiations in British Columbia 
(November 2006) at 13, online (pdf): 
<bcauditor.com/sites/default/files/publications/2006/report3/report/treaty-negotiations-british-
columbia.pdf>. 
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lands that result from the land selection process under the BCTC to the underlying title 
recognized by the courts over potentially all of a nation’s territory.43 Under the BCTC, 
through the Land Selection process, negotiating groups tend to be awarded on average 
5 percent of their total traditional land base.44 In addition, according to the courts, the 
nation “hold[s] an exclusive right to decide how to use and control the land, and to 
benefit from those uses.”45 This territorial authority and the uncertainty over which 
lands in BC are subject to Aboriginal title are precisely what governments and industry 
fear will grind economic development in the province to a halt. 
 
The BCTC captures through policy what the state calls “legal risk.” Legal 
risk is when legal decisions, actions, and “potential litigation and contingent 
liabilities” can have a “significant impact on the activities of the Department.”46 
According to Indigenous Affairs’ assessment, current policy frameworks could also 
be threatened by the development of legal precedents.47 But according to First Nations’ 
legal assessment of the Delgamuukw decision vis-à-vis the modern land claims policy, 
there was a very real threat to the province that Delgamuukw principles, if applied, 
would require the entire BCTC process to be overhauled to align with the 
acknowledgement of Aboriginal title, challenging (among other things) the Land 
Selection process.48 
 
The assessment also takes a strong position where it asserts that the CLCP 
and the BCTC are no longer based on a recognition of rights unless reformed: “[t]he 
model is an exchange model where aboriginal rights are extinguished in exchange for 
specific treaty rights. This is contrary to the recognition and affirmation language of 
section 35.”49 Other legal discrepancies of the land claims policies following 
Delgamuukw include the “the right to exclusive use and occupation,” the right to 
“chose to what uses the land can be put,” and the “inescapable economic component” 
that should have challenged third party rights on Aboriginal title territory, ushered in 
acknowledgement of Indigenous commercial rights, and gave Indigenous peoples a 
greater say over land use in the territory, though these implications were largely 
shouldered aside. 
 
Arthur Manuel also astutely noticed that one consequence of Delgamuukw 
was that the Province of British Columbia soon after had to incorporate into its annual 
 
43 Judith Sayers, “Treaties and Tsilhqot’in-Treaties at Risk? First Nations in BC Knowledge Network” (4 
July 2014), online: <fnbc.info/blogs/judith-sayers/treaties-and-tsilhqot-treaties-risk>. 
44 Shiri Pasternak, Grounded Authority: The Algonquins of Barriere Lake Against the State (Minneapolis: 
UMP, 2017), especially “Conclusion: A Land Claim Is Canada’s Claim: Against Extinguishment.” 
45 Ibid. 
46 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2017-2018 Corporate Risk Profile, online: (pdf) <aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-AEV/STAGING/texte-text/ss_crp_1488913411934_eng.pdf>. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Assembly of First Nations, Delgamuukw Implementation Strategic Committee (DISC), “Legal Review 
of Canada’s Comprehensive Land Claims Policy” (15 February 2002) at 11. 
49 Ibid. 
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audit report under the category of “Contingencies and Contractual Obligations” the 
burden of “Aboriginal Land Claims.”50 What is remarkable about this provincial 
reporting practice is that it took effect relatively shortly after the Delgamuukw decision 
through its incorporation into international financial accounting standards. Further, BC 
was reporting to manage its Aboriginal title liabilities through negotiations under the 
Comprehensive Land Claims policy and therefore the BCTC. In other words, the 
province used the suggested future event of settled land claims to cover up its failure 
to implement Supreme Court of Canada decisions and a broader territorial concept of 
Aboriginal Title. 
 
For those First Nations who have refused to negotiate under the policy, even 
the province had to admit that “[t]he amount of any provincial liability is not 
determinable at this time.”51 Therefore, the uncertainty remains, indeed it has 
continuously increased, especially since the first declaration of Aboriginal Title in 
Canadian history in the Tsihlqo’tin decision. The BCTC has now been in operation for 
almost three decades, more than two decades have elapsed since the Delgamuukw 
decision, and very few land claims settlements have been settled under the BCTC, 
certainly none in the large Indigenous territories in the interior of British Columbia. 
This shows the lack of effectiveness of the governments’ risk mitigation strategies, 
especially the BCTC, and the increasing uncertainty that results from this failure. 
 
Nonetheless, it appears from internal records that following the Delgamuukw 
decision both federal and provincial levels of government sought the modern treaty 
process as a mechanism of certainty. Internal documents show that INAC officials 
immediately began to work together on a strategy to accelerate the BCTC. In one letter, 
a Regional Director General of INAC in BC seeks assurance from the federal 
department that funding would be put in place to remedy some of the financial costs 
and implications of the Delgamuukw decision, to which Scott Serson, Deputy Minister 
of INAC, replies: “our best response to the Delgamuukw decision may be to get offers 
on the table sooner […] the objective is that acceleration of the process will help First 
Nations meet their social and economic objectives sooner, and provide the reassurance 
of certainty necessary for land and resource users.”52  In another letter, the Regional 
Director General of INAC BC reassures the provincial First Nations Summit – a treaty-
friendly First Nations coalition – that, “[b]oth governments are under tremendous 
pressure to ensure that we achieve the level of certainty required to reassure business 
 
50 Manuel & Derrickson, supra note 40; see also Canada, Public Accounts of Canada, 2005, “Vol I: 
Summary Report and Financial Statements” (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, 2005), specifically 2.26, “Financial Statements of the Government of Canada”. 
51 British Columbia, Public Accounts of the Government of the Province of British Columbia for the Fiscal 
Year Ended March 31, 2015 (Office of the Comptroller General, 2015) at 76. 
52 Letter from Scott Serson, Ministry of Indian Affairs, to Tony Penikett, Deputy Minister, Negotiations, 
Ministry of Finance and Corporate Relations, BC, Subject: “Post-Delgamuukw Issues of Mutual Concern”, 
obtained through FOI request to IRR-2018-80628. 
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and other third parties.”53 Throughout 1998, the federal government commits to 
support the BC treaty process through new financial investments.54 
 
Officials within the province, in particular, expressed anxiety about direct 
assertions of jurisdiction on the ground and further litigation that expands the scope of 
Aboriginal title. In a confidential memo that discusses BC’s proposed strategy to 
respond to the Delgamuukw decision, a bureaucrat suggests an incremental approach 
of “interim measures” in order to entice groups into the process who would otherwise 
be deterred by the decades-long process to reach a Final Agreement. The constraining 
conditions of the “interim measures” strategy, however, is that these agreements are 
contingent upon “First Nations agreeing to support economic stability in British 
Columbia by refraining from direct action or litigation.”55 The process itself explicitly 
restricts any assertions of rights outside of the government-set terms of negotiation. 
Other coercive strategies are outlined, as well. One outrageous memo 
suggests that money for “healing” from Indian Residential Schools should be 
prioritized for bands in the treaty process: 
 
It would be disturbing (although not surprising) if this initiative were not 
related in any way to treaty making in British Columbia. Were the federal 
government to be strategic in how this money were spent in British 
Columbia, then they would prioritize those First Nations with which they 
are having treaty negotiations as the major beneficiaries of this program. In 
addition, the money could be made available as a ‘down payment’ on an 
eventual treaty and given credit accordingly. This would serve to ‘sweeten 
the deal’ when it comes to the cash component of treaties and avoid ‘double 
counting’ which would otherwise inevitably occur. While it may be too late, 
it is to be hoped that the federal government could be asked to reflect on this 
before final decision on allocations are made.56 
 
There is no indication that this approach was widespread or adopted, but its offensive 
content conveys the panic to incentivize First Nations into the modern treaty process. 
 
 
53 John Watson, Regional Director General, BC Region, addressed to legal counsel for the First Nations 
Summit, Subject: “Informal Certainty Working Group” (16 April 1998), obtained through FOI request to 
IRR-2018-80628. 
54 Federal Minister of Indian Affairs, Jane Stewart, “Canada Demonstrates Commitment to Revitalizing BC 
Treaty Process”, press release and backgrounder (7 July 1998), obtained through FOI request to IRR-2018-
80628. 
55 Ministry of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation, Draft Briefing Note, “British Columbia’s Proposal 
for Accelerated Lands, Resources and Cash Negotiations” (labeled “For Discussion Purposes Only. Strictly 
Confidential. Shared between Governments and with First Nations Summit), obtained through FOI Request 
to IRR-2018-80628. The brief introduces measures to expedite process of treaty negotiation, with an 
emphasis on Interim Measures and Table-Specific Negotiations (at 314). 
56 Letter from Murray Rankin, Treaty Negotiator, Vancouver Island Team and Heinz Dyck, Assistant 
Negotiator, Vancouver Island Team to Christie Brown, Assistant Deputy Minister, Negotiations Division, 
BC, and Patrick O’Rourke, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, Planning and Implementation Division, 
Subject: “Ideas Regarding Treaty Process” (8 January 1998), obtained through FOI request to IRR-2018-
80628. 
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While early Aboriginal title jurisprudence could have triggered a 
restructuring of the modern treaty process and the regulatory regimes for resource 
extraction impacting Indigenous lands, it galvanized the opposite response from 
government and industry. Eager to frame the uncertainty of Aboriginal title as a result 
of the risky implications of Indigenous proprietary interests, rather than the historical 
problem of the province’s ownership claims, the BCTC was further marketed as a risk 
mitigation strategy along with other strategies of containment to restrict exercises of 
Indigenous territorial authority. Yet, the past decades have shown that these risk 
mitigation strategies have not proven to be effective, and legal and economic 
uncertainty has only increased.  
 
Privatizing Uncertainty and Socializing Risk 
 
In the documents reviewed in the section above, the shared focus of the provincial and 
federal governments to mitigate the uncertainty of Aboriginal title was to focus on the 
modern treaty process. From the outset, about 40 percent of British Columbia’s 
Indigenous peoples, especially those nations with large territories in the interior of 
British Columbia, have not engaged in the BCTC, believing that it stands to undermine 
their territorial authority. For example, Indigenous nations in the south central interior 
that form the Interior Alliance of Indigenous Nations are almost entirely out of the 
process and include the Secwepemc, Syilx (‘‘Okanagan’’), Nlaka’pamux 
(‘‘Thompson’’), and St’át’imc (‘‘Lillooet’’).57 At the National Energy Hearing board 
meeting on Trans Mountain, Arthur Manuel of the Neskonlith Indian Band put this 
refusal to negotiate in no uncertain terms: 
 
Neskonlith will not sit down with the federal government under the British 
Columbia Treaty process. We will not negotiate with the federal government 
on comprehensive -- under the Federal Comprehensive Land Claims Policy, 
not because we don't want to negotiate, not because we don’t want to talk, 
not because we don't want to come to some mutual agreement on 
development in our area. No, we won’t sit down with the federal 
government when their policy is to extinguish our Aboriginal title and 
rights. We just will not sit down with anybody whose idea is to kill us, to 
commit genocide against us. We won’t sit down with you. That’s it.58 
 
Therefore, the primary risk mitigation strategy deployed following the Delgamuukw 
decision – the BCTC – failed to manage risk in the region.59 
 
 
57 The BC Treaty Negotiating Times (2007), online (pdf): <cathedralgrove.eu/media/03-1-inet.pdf>. 
58 Arthur Manuel, Neskonlith Indian Band, “Oral Presentation”, National Energy Board Hearing Order OH-
001-2014, Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC, Trans Mountain Expansion Project (18 November 2014) at para 
7595. 
59 There is one exception to this generalization about the Secwepemc. The Northern Shuswap Tribal Council 
(NSTC), which includes 4 Northern Secwepemc te Qelmucw communities (NStQ), Tsq’escen’ (Canim 
Lake), Stswecem’c-Xgat’tem (Canoe-Dog Creek), Xat’sūll-Cm’etem (Soda-Deep Creek) and T’exelc 
(Williams Lake) is currently in the final phase of signing an Agreement-in-Principle under the BCTC: see 
“NStQ Treaty Group”, online: <nstqtreaty.ca> for more details. 
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Of course, modern treaty groups can also reject development and conflict 
with provincial and federal authorities; however, they tend to have their own resource 
revenue-sharing and co-management arrangements determined within the modern 
treaty settlement. Whereas for communities outside of these state policies, negotiations 
are more likely to unfold on a case-by-case basis. When the Tsihlqot’in decision came 
down, for example, the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation listed as 
a “Pre-treaty Approach,” “Revenue-sharing provides sector or project certainty.”60 
Similarly, legal contracts between Kinder Morgan and First Nation communities 
served as a key form of risk mitigation along the pipeline route. But this privatization 
of risk was only possible through the public claim to authorize development along the 
pipeline route by state agencies, from parks permitting to land title registration. 
Privatization and socialization go hand-in-hand. The risk was then further socialized 
by Canada when it bailed out Kinder Morgan in the 2017 purchase. 
 
Beginning with privatized risk mitigation, when Kinder Morgan was 
proponent they reported that they signed 43 Mutual Benefit Agreements (MBAs) with 
Indian Bands in BC and Alberta and that these agreements totalled $400 million.61 
Beyond MBAs, which secured what they called “big-ticket” items like resource 
revenue sharing deals and employment commitments, Kinder Morgan claimed to have 
entered into over 100 other kinds of commitments that included Letters of 
Memorandum or Letters of Understanding for capacity funding agreements, integrated 
cultural assessments, or participation in company-funded Land and Marine Use, and 
Traditional Ecological Knowledge studies.62 All of these agreements are confidential 
so there is no way to verify them or to know what methodology was used to calculate 
the total $400 million figure. 
 
One source of ambivalence, in addition, is that Natural Resources Canada 
(NRCAN), which now oversees the pipeline, assigned a different numerical value to 
these agreements. On NRCAN’s website on the TMEP, they write that there is over 
“$300 million committed to Indigenous groups by proponent under mutual benefit and 
capacity agreements.”63 Another $64.7 million was committed to an Indigenous 
advisory and monitoring committee. Even added together, this barely amounts to 
Kinder Morgan’s asserted $400 million in deals with Indigenous peoples, which 
pegged at the value of purchase would still only amount to around 6.7 percent of 
revenue if the correct figure is closer to $300 million. This is rather insignificant 
compensation compared to the astronomical expense of the pipeline ($4.5 billion and 
rising64) and its expected revenues, therefore a relatively cheap risk mitigation 
 
60 British Columbia, Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, William Decision – Initial 
Response (July 2014) [unpublished]. 
61 Trans Mountain, “43 Indigenous Groups Have Signed Agreements in Support of the Trans Mountain 
Expansion Project” (19 April 2018), online: <transmountain.com/news>. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Government of Canada, Trans Mountain Expansion Project, online: 
<nrcan.gc.ca/energy/resources/19142>. 
64 “Cost to Twin Trans Mountain pipeline $1.9B Higher than Expected, Kinder Morgan Documents Show”, 
Toronto Star (7 August 2018), online: <thestar.com>. 
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strategy. The job numbers promised by Canada were also misleading. While Canada 
repeated consistently that the TMEP would create 15,000 construction jobs, 
independent economist Robyn Allan calculated “the more realistic figure is less than 
20 percent that size.”65 When questioned by Allan, the governments pointed back to 
the proponent’s figures, having never verified the calculation themselves. 
 
While proponent-led, private agreements can offer limited financial benefits 
to specific Indian Bands and conditional job promises, they are private law contracts 
that do not rise to the level required for consent at the public law or nation-to-nation 
level because they do not engage with the proper title and rights holder and do not 
require collective decision-making. They also tend to overemphasize “economic 
incentives and impact mitigation, but tend to circumvent broader, more complex 
questions about the social acceptability of projects and their cultural, social, and 
economic cumulative impact.”66 The requirement of collective decision-making as 
discussed above, is grounded in both Indigenous law and governance, as well as in the 
jurisprudence on Aboriginal title which points to Indigenous laws and governance 
systems for determining the proper title and rights holders. 
 
But in public statements, federal politicians rarely failed to mention either the 
agreements or the employment numbers when courting social license for the project,67 
particularly in times of intense public opposition, such as when the BC provincial 
government came to power and vowed to stop the pipeline and when First Nations led 
massive demonstrations against it.68 Furthermore, the misappropriation of the concept 
of the proper “title and rights holder” became material in what could be called a public 
relations war as a form of risk mitigation. When Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and 
Alberta Premier Rachel Notley first declared publicly that they would spend public 
money to purchase the pipeline, Trudeau stated, “Canada has completed the deepest 
consultations with rights holders ever on a major project in this country. And working 
with our indigenous partners has been paramount. All of the private contracts were 
 
65 Robyn Allan, “The Search for Trans Mountain’s 15,000 Construction Jobs”, The Record (11 September 
2017), online: <therecord.com/opinion-story/7549132-the-search-for-trans-mountain-s-15-000-
construction-jobs/>. 
66 Martin Papillon & Thierry Rodon, “Proponent-Indigenous Agreements and the Implementation of the 
Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in Canada” (2017) 62 Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 
217. 
67 According to an ATIP document requesting “[a]ll briefings, memos, and correspondence relating to 
Kinder Morgan between January 1, 2016 to February 21, 2017,” nearly all Question Period, Media, and 
Briefing Notes after the federal buy-out were focused on a few main talking points, including the promise 
of “15,000 jobs for middle class Canadians” and the evidence of “consent” from Indigenous peoples through 
signed agreements with Kinder Morgan (A-2016-00831). 
68 British Columbia, Attorney General, “Statement on Trans Mountain Pipeline” (1 September 2017), online: 
<news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2017AG0017-001516>; Rhianna Schmunk, “B.C. Going to Province’s Highest 
Court in Attempt to Fight Trans Mountain Pipeline”, CBC News (18 April 2018), online: <cbc.ca/news>; 
and CBC News, “Indigenous Groups Lead Protest against Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain Pipeline Plan”, 
CBC News (10 March 2018), online: <cbc.ca/news>. 
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adopted by the federal government.”69 Trudeau emphasized that the proponent secured 
permission for the pipeline from Indian Bands and by adding that these agreements 
are with “rights holders,” suggested that the duties to engage in meaningful 
consultation and consensus-building had been dispensed. 
 
Such statements also dangerously set the scene for criminalizing Indigenous 
land and water defenders. Marginalizing those who contest the pipeline as individual 
“protestors” who do not have legal rights to contest the development denies the 
collective, territorial use-based understanding of title held by the Supreme Court and 
Secwepemc law. Nonetheless, land defenders are well aware of their rights as inherent 
title holders. As Secwepemc-Ktunaxa activist Kanahus Manuel stated to the press: 
“[t]his is no airy fairy modified-rights based approach, give the natives their berry 
picking and they’re happy. No. It’s full, 100 percent control over every inch of our 
territory.”70 She added, “They want to move a rock? We have an economic interest in 
that. They want to take a tree down? We have an economic interest.”71 The eviction of 
the Tiny House Warriors, with whom Manuel is affiliated, and her arrest from North 
Thompson River Provincial Park72 indicates the criminal implications of this narrow 
approach to title.73 The province-wide injunction that Kinder Morgan secured to limit 
disruption to pipeline construction has not been lifted since the change of ownership.74 
 
Yet the Prime Minister has clung petulantly to these low-level private 
contractual agreements that do not meet the threshold for consent, especially when 
pretending to engage on a nation-to-nation basis as a government. At the AFN Special 
Chiefs Assembly, he scolded Chief Judy Wilson for asking a question about how her 
Secwepemc community and the larger opposition of the Secwepemc people to TMEP 
would be factored into the international standard of consent set by UNDRIP, which 
Trudeau’s Liberals re-endorsed: 
 
Chief Judy Wilson (Neskonlith): When you're talking about the United 
Nations and you’re going to go with the self-determination and the consent, 
 
69 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, “Statement on the Trans Mountain Pipeline Project” (15 April 2018), 
online: <pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2018/04/15/prime-ministers-statement-trans-mountain-pipeline-
project> [emphasis added]. 
70 Hilary Beaumont, “Trudeau’s Trans Mountain Fight Isn’t with B.C., It’s with First Nations” Vice News 
(13 April 2018), online: <news.vice.com>. 
71 Ibid. 
 
72 Justin Brake, “Tiny House Warriors Establish New Village to Resist Pipeline, Assert Secwepemc 
Sovereignty”, APTN National News (19 July 2018), online: <aptnnews.ca>. 
73 See e.g. Canada, Aboriginal Affairs, Aboriginal Civil Disobedience: Lessons Learned, by Michael 
Hudson, Deputy Attorney General of Aboriginal Affairs Portfolio, in consultation with the Business and 
Regulatory Affairs Portfolio (DFO Legal Services), the Citizenship, Immigration and Public Security 
Portfolio (Public Safety Legal Services), and the National Security Group, Civil Litigation Portfolio (30 
April 2007). See also Shiri Pasternak, Tia Dafnos & Sue Collis, “Criminalization at Tyendinaga: Securing 
Canada’s Colonial Property Regime Through Specific Claims” (2013) 28:1 CJLS 65. 
74 Dylan Waisman, “Kinder Morgan Injunction Expanded Across B.C.”, National Observer (3 June 2018), 
online: <nationalobserver.com>. 
226 UNBLJ    RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 70 
why wasn't that applied with the Trans Mountain pipeline that's going 
through 513 kilometres of our territory?  
 
There was no consent on that, and you can’t count a few IBAs that you’ve 
done with some of the communities as consent, because it’s the proper title-
holders of those nations that hold the title, and it’s the bands that might have 
been under duress — or whatever reasons they did that — but it’s not a 
proper process at all. 
 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: I would be careful about minimizing or 
ascribing reasons for people who take positions that disagree with you… I 
don’t think we should be criticizing them, just because they disagree with 
you, Judy.75 
 
Rather than address the problem Chief Wilson raises about whether due legal process 
was followed in obtaining Indigenous consent for the pipeline, the Prime Minister 
warns her not to ascribe intention to other First Nations. But Chief Wilson’s point is 
that what Trudeau is calling “agreement” is not consent, because those he referred to 
publicly as “title and rights holders” are not the nation and therefore not the proper 
title and rights holder.76 
 
We must also read Trudeau’s comments in light of the Federal Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General),77 which 
actually reversed the same federal government’s approval of the proposed TMEP in 
light of failure to properly consult and accommodate Indigenous peoples. The federal 
government had not even met the lesser standard of consultation, and yet was still 
maintaining they had gained consent. More particularly, in August 30, 2018, the Order 
in Council by federal Cabinet approving the TMEP was quashed, partly as a result of 
a lack of meaningful consultation with Indigenous peoples. The nations along the 
pipeline, the Tsleil-Waututh, Squamish, Musqueam, Coldwater, Sto:lo, 
Stk’emplumpsemc Te Secwepemc, Upper Nicola Indian Band, Tulalip Tribes, and the 
Squamish Tribe all filed for judicial reviews of the National Energy Board’s report on 
TMEP and the Order in Council to approve it. These cases were consolidated into 
Tsleil-Waututh and resulted in a victory for the appellants. 
 
The Minister of Crown Indigenous Relations, Carolyn Bennett, also indicated 
that divisions among Indigenous peoples would be the focus of her Ministry’s strategy 
to obtain “consent” for the pipeline project. On May 29, 2018 – one day before Canada 
announced the purchase of the Trans Mountain pipeline from Kinder Morgan – 
Minister Bennett appeared before a Parliamentary committee on Indigenous Affairs. 
 
75 Carl Meyer, “Trudeau Urges First Nation Chief to Respect Trans Mountain Supporters”, National 
Observer (4 December 2018), online: <nationalobserver.com>. 
76 The Prime Minister was further chastised by the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs for addressing 
Chief Wilson’s by her first name – unprecedented in any of his interactions with male chiefs that day; see 
Ellen Neel, “UBCIC, OPEN LETTER: UBCIC Demands Apology from PM Trudeau for Comments to 
Secretary-Treasurer Kukpi7 Judy Wilson” (5 December 2018), online: 
<ubcic.bc.ca/demands_apology_from_pm_trudeau>. 
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She was asked, “[a]s the minister for crown relations, what are you going to do to de-
escalate the tension and potential for perhaps even violence as you move this project 
forward?”78 The Minister responded: “I think it's really important that people 
understand that the First Nations do have different views on this, and people like Chief 
Ernie Crey have been clear about the advantage that would take place for his people.”79 
Here, consent is sidelined to make room for a diversity of opinions on the pipeline. 
The Minister dodges the question of consent again when the issue comes up directly 
soon after. 
 
Cathy McLeod (Kamloops-Thompson-Cariboo, CPC): I would like to ask 
you if you think it's fair that you have failed to be clear in what your 
definition was of FPIC because the decision today clearly demonstrated 
what your definition of FPIC actually is. 
 
Hon. Carolyn Bennett: I think we've been very clear that FPIC is not a veto 
and a consensus does not mean unanimity, and that in so many areas—
particularly in this one—33 Indian Act bands agreed to participate in the 
decision that twinning an existing pipeline was a better option than other 
options, and that their people would benefit from it in terms of jobs and other 
things.80 
 
The Minister then doubles-down on private agreements, stating, “[e]ven today there is 
probably going to be an offer of a First Nations-led consortium on having equity and 
being part of, perhaps, owning the pipeline…”81 In this statement, Minister Bennett 
floats the possibility of an even deeper investment by First Nations into the pipeline in 
the form of equity ownership. In January 2019, the Indian Resources Council of 
Canada (IRCC) held a meeting to develop a proposal to Ottawa to acquire the pipeline 
project.82 Then the frontline of opposition, as the federal government well understands, 
will be First Nation against First Nation. Most recently, though, the Alberta 
government raised the stakes by announcing its intent to enact legislation that would 
create a Crown corporation to backstop First Nations’ ownership of the pipeline.83 
 
But it will not be so easy. As Squamish Nation councillor and spokesperson 
Khelsilem Rivers stated to the press, “[t]he reality is, if they want to build this pipeline 
they have to come through our titled land. That is our land. They don't have the right 
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to say anything about what happens on our territory just like we don’t have the right 
to say what happens to theirs.”84 
 
Conclusion: Subverting Consent 
 
A friend pointed out recently that the public conversation about First Nations’ consent 
to resource extraction in Canada is absurd if you think about it like sex.85 For while 
the right to “consent” is rhetorically granted to First Nations by the current federal 
government, it is always qualified by politicians who hasten to add that this right does 
not constitute a “veto” power.86 However, what if we thought about this qualification 
in an analogous way: if a woman did not consent to sex, would we call this a “veto” 
power? Would this not indicate that she has the right to say yes, but not the right to 
say no? In effect, this is the situation for First Nations in Canada today. The discourse 
of consent is powerfully shaped by qualifications and forms of interpretation that 
produce something akin to a rape culture of Indigenous lands.87 
 
While Indian bands should have autonomy to determine the fate of their 
communities, governments must understand the legal definitions of consent as 
conceptualized by the courts, Indigenous peoples, and international law. Falling back 
on politically motivated and manufactured concepts of consent will only escalate the 
risk of disruption to projects where Indigenous peoples refuse to consent. The federal 
government, though, simply refuses to acknowledge that when consent is not 
forthcoming, and they persist, they are in fact engaging in violent force. Just recently, 
this denial was showcased in opposition to a proposed bill to legislate the UNDRIP, 
which includes several clauses to protect Indigenous peoples consent, into Canadian 
law.88 In response, the assistant deputy minister in the implementation sector for 
Crown-Indigenous Relations stated, “[t]here is no international or domestic agreement 
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on the meaning of the principle of free, prior and informed consent,” agreeing however 
that it was about “building consensus.”89 And if consensus cannot be built?  
 
Then you build the pipeline anyway. As a coda to this article, the Liberal 
government recently announced its decision to approve the TMEP. The Prime Minister 
stated, “[w]e have made the decision to buy the pipeline based on […] de-risking the 
pipeline. There were political risks that the private sector wasn’t willing to take on so 
we had to purchase the pipeline, but we have no intention of being the lone operator 
of that pipeline that’s why we will eventually sell it and that’s why we are looking at 
Indigenous participation.”90 There, in one statement, the purchase of the pipeline is 
explicitly linked to the risk posed by Indigenous territorial authority and jurisdiction. 
By encouraging Indigenous investment and participation, the federal government may 
mitigate the risk of opposition by those who oppose its development and refuse to 
consent. When pushed, though, by one journalist to define free, prior and informed 
consent in relation to Indigenous participation, the Prime Minister responded: “[it] is 
what we engaged in doing with Indigenous communities over the past number of 
months. It is engaging, looking with them, listening to the issues they have, and 
responding meaningfully to the concerns they have wherever possible.”91 The 
“wherever possible” here is key. Because the possibilities are alarmingly narrow when 
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